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RLUIPA AS A POSSIBLE SHIELD FROM THE 
GOVERNMENT TAKING OF RELIGIOUS PROPERTY  
       
Allison Scaduto∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
Two hundred thirty years ago, one commentator writing on bur-
ial rites observed that “there is perhaps nothing else so distinctive of 
the condition and character of a people as the method in which they 
treat their dead.”1  Today, this prudent revelation is being put to the 
test.  The preservation of cemeteries and other sacred burial sites is 
often at odds with government ideals—namely the condemnation of 
said land for public use under the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.2  Despite their unique purpose in the community, 
cemeteries and other land used by religious institutions are just as 
susceptible to the government’s eminent domain power as are all 
other forms of land.  With the enactment of the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA, or “the Act”) 
comes the hope of a statutory shield against condemnation proceed-
ings that affect religious burial sites and other religious uses of prop-
erty.3  As recent case law suggests, however, cemetery protection from 
a government’s power of eminent domain under RLUIPA is tenuous 
and problematic.4
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2008, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Bowdoin Col-
lege, 2002.  I would like to extend a special thanks to Professor Rachel Godsil for her 
invaluable guidance and assistance during the creation of this comment.  
 1 WILLIAM TEGG, THE LAST ACT: BEING THE FUNERAL RITES OF NATIONS AND 
INDIVIDUALS 9 (William Tegg ed., 1876). 
 2 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 3 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000cc to -5 (2000).  This comment focuses on the land use provisions of the Act, not 
those pertaining to institutionalized persons. 
 4 Compare St. John’s United Church v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 899 
(N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 21914 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2007) (declin-
ing to apply RLUIPA to municipal eminent domain actions), and Temple Faith 
Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 254–55 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (same), 
with Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 
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Congress enacted RLUIPA to give additional protection to pri-
vate land used primarily for religious exercise, with the hopes of pre-
venting government actions that impose a substantial burden on the 
free exercise of religion.5  However, the Act was narrowly tailored to 
govern only government actions that constitute “land use regula-
tion[s].”6  Whether an eminent domain proceeding is a land use 
regulation under RLUIPA is the central question in the debate.  An 
affirmative answer to that question could be the decisive factor guar-
anteeing additional protection for religious institutions and their 
chosen land uses.  Conversely, if an eminent domain proceeding is 
not considered a land use regulation within the scope of RLUIPA, 
then religious institutions and cemetery preservationists will have lit-
tle success using RLUIPA as a defense against the condemnation of 
their sacred land.  This Comment contends that eminent domain 
proceedings are not per se land use regulations within the scope of 
RLUIPA, but that an eminent domain proceeding might fall under 
RLUIPA’s umbrella if undertaken as part of a plan to ultimately exe-
cute a land use regulation. 
Part II traces the history of the Act and the current district court 
debate over RLUIPA’s application to condemnation proceedings.    
Part III analyzes whether an eminent domain proceeding is a land 
use regulation within the scope of RLUIPA and evaluates the argu-
ments on each side of that debate.  Part IV explores the conse-
quences of declaring that eminent domain is not a recognized land 
use regulation protected under RLUIPA.  Finally, Part V considers 
the future of the Act’s relationship with eminent domain and the 
current push to amending the Act to include eminent domain as a 
per se land use regulation. 
II. RLUIPA AND ST. JOHN’S UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST 
A look at the controversial history of RLUIPA will provide the 
foundation for the current federal court debate over its application to 
condemnation proceedings, as well as a useful backdrop for explor-
ing the issue.  The leading case in this debate is St. John’s United 
 
1203, 1218 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (applying RLUIPA to municipal eminent domain action 
in grant of preliminary injunction). 
 5 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).  See generally 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 
2000) (statements of Sens. Hatch, Kennedy, and Reid). 
 6 § 2000cc(a)(1).  See also 146 CONG. REC. S7779 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (refer-
ring to RLUIPA as “a narrowly-tailored religious freedom protection measure”). 
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Church of Christ v. City of Chicago7—decided in the Northern District of 
Illinois in the wake of Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress Development 
Agency.8  With Supreme Court jurisprudence nonexistent and district 
court analysis scarce, the discussion is just beginning. 
A. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
RLUIPA is the product of a ten-year tug-of-war between the Su-
preme Court of the United States and Congress regarding the appro-
priate standard of review for government actions—specifically land 
use regulations—that affect religious actors.9  The debate began with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith10 that 
religious actors are not automatically exempt from compliance with 
“neutral, generally applicable regulatory law[s].”11  The Smith Court 
proclaimed that it would no longer apply the Sherbert v. Verner balanc-
ing test,12 which was used since 1963 and allowed the government to 
substantially burden religious exercise if such actions were “justified 
by a compelling governmental interest.”13
In direct response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Smith, Con-
gress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
(RFRA).14  The purpose of RFRA was to reinstate the Sherbert compel-
ling interest test in place of the neutrality test prescribed in Smith.15  
The risk inherent in the regulation of religious land uses was that by 
“controlling where churches may locate, governments control the 
kind of mission they may pursue, and so risk forcing churches to con-
form to the community’s vision of the ‘proper’ church.”16  While the 
legislature’s concerns were well substantiated,17 the Supreme Court 
 
 7 401 F. Supp. 2d 887. 
 8 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203. 
 9 St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 897. 
 10 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 11 Id. at 880–81. 
 12 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). 
 13 Smith, 494 U.S. at 883. 
 14 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -5 (2000).  
In RFRA, Congress found that the Smith decision had “virtually eliminated the re-
quirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws 
neutral toward religion”—a clear indication that the legislation was intended as a 
direct response to Smith.  Id. § 2000bb(a)(4); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507, 512 (1997) (“Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to . . . Smith . . . .”). 
 15 § 2000bb(b)(1). 
 16 Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act of 2000: A Constitutional Response to Unconstitutional Zoning Prac-
tices, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 929, 941 (2001). 
 17 See Angela C. Carmella & Eugene Gressman, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exer-
cise Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 67 (1996) (“Seldom has Congress been inspired to 
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reacted in opposition to Congress.  Five years later, the Supreme 
Court ruled in City of Boerne v. Flores18 that RFRA was unconstitutional 
because it exceeded Congress’s Enforcement Clause power under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.19  Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy 
reasoned that the Act’s widespread coverage of all federal, state, and 
local government actions—regardless of the level of religious bigotry 
motivating such actions—in conjunction with RFRA’s compelling in-
terest test resulted in “RFRA’s impact [being] disproportionate to the 
constitutional harms it was designed to prevent.”20  This dispropor-
tionality between the goals of the statute and the means used to reach 
those goals indicated that RFRA was not enacted as a remedial or 
preventative measure,21 but as a “substantive change in constitutional 
protections.”22  Such action by Congress challenged vital separation 
of powers principles.  Never before had Congress enacted a statute 
imposing on the judiciary an obligation to discount a Supreme Court 
decision interpreting a constitutional provision and replacing it in-
stead with what Congress deemed a “better interpretive approach.”23  
Dating back to Marbury v. Madison, it has been “emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”24  
As a consequence, Congress lacked the power to enact RFRA—
legislation that invaded the judiciary’s jurisdiction and role in the 
United States government.25  Thus, the Supreme Court struck down 
RFRA in 1997.26
After the failure of RFRA, Congress decided to forgo the Smith 
neutrality approach, and responded by enacting RLUIPA.27  Aware of 
its powers to enact legislation “to enforce and protect some specified 
 
express such quick indignation and displeasure with a constitutional decision of the 
Supreme Court or been so eager to overturn the substance of such a decision.”). 
 18 521 U.S. 507. 
 19 Id. at 536; see also Storzer & Picarello, supra note 16, at 942. 
 20 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Carmella & Gressman, supra note 17. 
 24 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 25 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
 26 Id.  Justice Stevens, concurring, argued that the Act provided religious institu-
tions with a weapon against the government that was not available to non-religious 
institutions and therefore was in violation of the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 537 
(Stevens, J., concurring); see also Storzer & Picarello, supra note 16, at 942. 
 27 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000cc to -5 (2000). 
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aspects of religious exercise,”28 Congress deliberately created RLUIPA 
to be more narrow than RFRA.  RLUIPA applies only to governmen-
tal burdens that are imposed by or in the implementation of a land 
use regulation,29 which the statute defines as: 
a zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, 
that limits or restricts a claimant’s use or development of land 
(including a structure affixed to land), if the claimant has an 
ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other property in-
terest in the regulated land or a contract or option to acquire 
such an interest.30
RLUIPA mandates that: 
[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a 
manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exer-
cise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, 
unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the bur-
den on that person, assembly, or institution— 
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and 
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compel-
ling governmental interest.31
RLUIPA was significantly more circumscribed than RFRA.  Con-
gress determined that there was a specific need for legislation pro-
tecting land used for religious purposes.32  Members of Congress 
maintained that a religious group’s right to buy, rent, or build on 
land is an “indispensable adjunct” of the First Amendment right to 
gather for religious exercise and worship.33  RLUIPA was enacted fol-
lowing “three years of hearings . . . that addressed in great detail both 
the need for legislation and the scope of Congressional power to en-
act such legislation.”34  The legislative hearing record accumulated 
considerable evidence of widespread violations of the right to assem-
 
 28 Carmella & Gressman, supra note 17, at 141; 146 CONG. REC. S7774, S7777 
(daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
 29 St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 897 
(N.D. Ill. 2005). 
 30 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5).  Professor Carmella refers to land use regulations as 
including: historic preservation, zoning and planning, environmental protection, 
urban renewal, and nondiscrimination in housing.  Angela C. Carmella, Land Use 
Regulation of Churches, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF 
IDENTITY, LIBERTY, AND THE LAW 565, 565 (James A. Serritella ed., 2006). 
 31 Id. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
 32 See infra Part II.C. 
 33 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch 
and Sen. Kennedy). 
 34 Id. 
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ble for worship.35  Religious institutions “are frequently discriminated 
against on the face of zoning codes and also in the highly individual-
ized and discretionary processes of land use regulation.”36  To combat 
this problem and support Congress’s objectives, RLUIPA specifies 
that it is to be “construed in favor of a broad protection of religious 
exercise.”37
Professor Angela Carmella posits that the extent to which a gov-
ernment will accommodate religious land use depends on “whether 
equality or liberty is considered the paramount value in contempo-
rary constitutional interpretation.”38  A high value on equality would 
protect religious institutions from discriminatory treatment, but place 
religious organizations on the same terms as their secular counter-
parts.39  Conversely, a high value on liberty would treat religious or-
ganizations more preferably than their secular counterparts due to 
the unique place religious institutions hold in society.40  Professor 
Carmella argues that RLUIPA incorporates both rationales through a 
complementary approach: “[t]he law embraces a liberty rationale 
when it sets out to protect religious land use from burdensome zon-
ing and historic preservation regulation that lack compelling justifica-
tion.  It adopts an equality rationale when it sets a protective floor, 
preventing government discrimination towards and exclusion of reli-
gious land use.”41  RLUIPA, devised in this fashion, signals a new 
commitment to the elimination of burdens that inhibit religious 
freedom.42
If faced with a constitutional challenge to RLUIPA, it appears 
highly likely that the Supreme Court will find RLUIPA to be a consti-
tutionally valid exercise of congressional power.43  Relying upon its 
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, 
and the Spending Clause, Congress “made the law extremely specific 
 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000cc-3(g) (2000). 
 38 Carmella, supra note 30, at 565 (footnote omitted). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 565–66. 
 41 Id. at 566. 
 42 See id. at 571. 
 43 See Mintz v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 424 F. Supp. 2d 309, 315–16 (D. Mass. 
2006) (observing that “nearly every court which has considered the issue” has found 
RLUIPA’s constraints on land use regulations constitutional). 
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to ensure the law was narrowly tailored”44 so that it would pass consti-
tutional muster and not be invalidated by the Supreme Court as its 
predecessor—RFRA—was earlier in the decade.45  RLUIPA was spe-
cifically designed to be narrower than RFRA, although it offers simi-
lar protection for religious institutions from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusions.46  Unlike RFRA, RLUIPA “codified existing free 
exercise, Establishment Clause, and equal protection rights . . . [and] 
did not attempt any substantive change in constitutional protec-
tion.”47  Accordingly, nearly every court to address RLUIPA has found 
it constitutional.48  In August 2006, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the constitutionality of RLUIPA 
in Elsinore Christian Center. v. City of Lake Elsinore.49  The Ninth Circuit 
reversed the district court decision, which was possibly the only deci-
sion ever to find the Act’s land use provisions unconstitutional.50
B. St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago51
Even if RLUIPA is constitutional, however, the question of 
whether its reach extends to exercises of eminent domain remains 
ambiguous.  In one of the first cases to consider the question, the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held 
in St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago that the city’s emi-
 
 44 Kevin M. Powers, Note, The Sword and the Shield: RLUIPA and the New Battle 
Ground of Religious Freedom, 22 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 145, 155 (2004). 
 45 Id. at 155–56. 
 46 Id. 
 47 DANIEL P. SELMI & JAMES A. KUSHNER, LAND USE REGULATION 366 (2d ed. 2004). 
 48 Mintz, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 315–16 (collecting cases discussing the constitutional-
ity of RLUIPA’s land use provisions); see Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y v. County of Sutter, 
456 F.3d 978, 995 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that RLUIPA was “constitutionally en-
acted . . . pursuant to [Congress’s] enforcement power within Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment”); San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 
F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the Ninth Circuit had previously held 
RLUIPA to be a “constitutional exercise of Congress’s spending power”); Midrash 
Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1237–43 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that RLUIPA is a “proper exercise of Congress’s . . . powers”); Freedom Baptist 
Church v. Twp. of Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857, 874 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (holding 
RLUIPA’s land use provisions constitutional as applied to states and municipalities); 
Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 
1221 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (opining in dicta that RLUIPA “avoided the flaws of its 
predecessor RFRA, and [is] within Congress’s constitutional authority”). 
 49 Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 197 F. App’x 718, 719 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
 50 See Mintz, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 316.  This Comment specifically addresses the 
Act’s land use provisions and not the provisions pertaining to institutionalized per-
sons. 
 51 401 F. Supp. 2d 887 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
SCADUTO_FINALV3 4/11/2008  11:15:59 AM 
830 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:823 
 
                                                
nent domain proceedings were outside of the umbrella of RLUIPA 
protection.52  When the City of Chicago exercised its power of emi-
nent domain in an effort to acquire land for the expansion of O’Hare 
International Airport, land used by St. Johannes Cemetery and Rest 
Haven Cemetery was included in the acquisition.53  Holding that the 
City of Chicago’s authority to acquire land pursuant to its power of 
eminent domain did not constitute a land use regulation under 
RLUIPA, the court concluded that the plaintiffs54 had no basis for a 
claim under the federal statute and thus dismissed the RLUIPA 
claim.55  In concluding that RLUIPA did not apply to the eminent 
domain proceedings alleged in this case, the court reasoned that the 
Act applies only to governmental actions that “impose or implement 
a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden 
on the religious exercise of a person.”56  The court did not find any 
statutory support for the proposition that a taking of land pursuant to 
a government’s power of eminent domain directly constituted a land 
use regulation under RLUIPA, and therefore, statutory protection of 
the land used by the religious institution was not warranted.57
 
 52 Id. at 900. 
 53 Id. at 890–91.  While the acquisition was pending, the City also passed the 
O’Hare Modernization Act (OMA) to ward off opposition to the acquisition.  Id. at 
891.  As amended by the OMA, the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act stated 
that “[n]othing in this act limits the authority of the City of Chicago to exercise its 
powers . . . for the purposes of relocation of cemeteries or the graves located 
therein.”  Id. at 891 (internal citations omitted).  The OMA was unmistakably in-
tended to silence religious objections to the taking.  See id. 
 54 The Village, the Church, and the Cemeteries were named as plaintiffs.  Id. at 
891. 
 55 Id. at 901.  The remaining constitutional claims against the City of Chicago, the 
FAA, and the State of Illinois alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment even-
tually failed as well.  Id.  In regard to the Free Exercise claim, the law treats all land in 
the path of expansion the same and the city does not specifically discriminate against 
religion in its acquisition of land.  Id. at 898. Thus, the court need only apply a ra-
tional basis test.  Id.  Chicago’s actions “are rationally related to the legitimate gov-
ernment objective of expanding and improving O’Hare,” thus the Free Exercise 
claim fails.  Id.  In regard to the Equal Protection claim, “where a plaintiff’s First 
Amendment Free Exercise claim has failed, the Supreme Court has applied only a 
rational basis scrutiny in its subsequent review of an equal protection fundamental 
right to religious free exercise claim based on the same facts.”  Id.  (quoting Wirz-
burger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 282–83 (1st Cir. 2005)).  Therefore, this claim fails as 
well.  See id. at 898–901. 
 56 Id. at 887; Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000). 
 57 St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 887. 
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While the majority conclusion in St. John’s gives credence to the 
argument that eminent domain is not a land use regulation under 
RLUIPA, the primary case cited by the plaintiffs in St. John’s—and 
most often proffered by those who contend that RLUIPA does apply to 
eminent domain proceedings—is Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress 
Redevelopment Agency.58  In that case, the Cottonwood Christian Center 
was denied the necessary permit for the expansion of its church facili-
ties.59  Subsequent to the denial of the permit, the city made plans to 
take the Cottonwood property by its power of eminent domain and 
turn it over to a private developer.60  In an action brought by the 
Church against the City of Cypress and the Cypress Redevelopment 
Agency under RLUIPA, the United States District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunc-
tion halting the eminent domain actions.61  The Cottonwood court re-
jected the defendants’ claim that RLUIPA does not apply to the gov-
ernment’s condemnation action because it is not a land use regula-
tion, as set forth under the Act, and instead applied RLUIPA’s strict 
scrutiny analysis to review the city’s actions.62
In St. John’s, the court distinguished the reasoning of the Cotton-
wood court and rejected the plaintiffs’ dependence on the Cottonwood 
case.63  While the “[p]laintiffs contend[ed] that Cottonwood stands for 
the proposition that all exercises of eminent domain authority are 
subject to RLUIPA . . . . [the c]ourt [wa]s not willing to take such an 
expansive view, nor [did] it believe that Cottonwood stands for such a 
sweeping proposition.”64  The St. John’s court asserted that Cottonwood 
could only be read to suggest that RLUIPA applies to “specific emi-
nent domain actions where the condemnation proceeding is inter-
twined with other actions by the city involving zoning regulations.”65
In addition to finding the reasoning of the Cottonwood court un-
persuasive, the St. John’s court aptly noted that there is an attenuated 
 
 58 Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 
1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 59 Id. at 1214; cf. St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 900 (carefully noting the difference 
in the governmental use of power exercised directly against the property in Cotton-
wood (a permit denial of the facility expansion) as compared to the governmental use 
of power in St. John’s (eminent domain proceeding directly against the religious 
property)). 
 60 Cottonwood Christian Ctr., 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1214–15. 
 61 Id. at 1209. 
 62 Id. at 1221–22 
 63 St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 899–900. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 900. 
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relationship between eminent domain and zoning.66  The court re-
jected the plaintiffs’ argument that the City’s actions “can be linked 
to zoning regulations because the City’s proposed actions ‘impose 
severe restrictions on St. John’s use or development of St. Johannes[ 
]’ . . . [and] are attempts to regulate the land and so are an act of 
zoning.”67  The court emphasized that the acquisition was not a re-
striction on the use of the land and to call it so would not only be a 
major understatement, but an incorrect classification of the govern-
ment’s eminent domain powers.68  Although land use regulations 
limit an owner’s use of property and condemnations are the ultimate 
limitation on an owner’s use of property, the court clarified that this 
similarity does not mean that a taking automatically constitutes a land 
use regulation under RLUIPA.69  In reaching its holding, the court 
declared that it was “no[t] persuaded that it should construe the con-
cept of zoning so broadly that any acquisition of land by the City pur-
suant to eminent domain proceedings is an act of zoning.”70  The 
court highlighted the fact that a material distinction exists between 
land use regulations and condemnation proceedings, and that Con-
gress’s purposeful exclusion of eminent domain from its definition of 
a land use regulation under the Act is of great consequence in this 
ongoing debate.71    
This issue is hotly contested in the lower courts and has yet to 
reach the Supreme Court of the United States.  An evaluation of the 
legislative history of RLUIPA, however, provides some guidance as to 
the congressional purpose behind the Act and the intended scope of 
the Act. 
C. RLUIPA’s Legislative History Examined 
While parties on both sides of the debate use legislative history 
to bolster their position, the legislative evidence more strongly sup-
ports the argument that a taking is not intended to be included un-
der the Act.  In the City of Chicago’s trial brief, the City alleged that 
Congress’s definition of a land use regulation was specifically narrow 
 
 66 Id. at n.7. 
 67 Id. at 900. 
 68 Id. 
 69 St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 900. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
SCADUTO_FINALV3 4/11/2008  11:15:59 AM 
2008] COMMENT 833 
                                                
and deliberate.72  Considering the constitutionally sensitive time at 
which Congress enacted RLUIPA, many argue that the limited defini-
tion of land use regulation was purposeful “as RLUIPA’s drafters 
sought to ‘avoid the . . . fate’ of judicial invalidation that befell 
RFRA.”73  A quick reference to the Smith, RFRA, Boerne, and RLUIPA 
progression provides support for the necessity of having such a strictly 
focused construction of the statute.74  Indeed, Senator Reid drew at-
tention to the relevance of this progression in the Congressional Re-
cord.75
“The legislative history [of RLUIPA] indicates that Congress was 
concerned about local governments’ use of their zoning authority to 
discriminate against religious groups by making it difficult or impos-
sible for them to build places of worship or other facilities.”76  Verify-
ing RLUIPA’s purpose, Representative Charles Canady of Florida as-
serted that the Act “will protect the free exercise of religion from un-
necessary government interference.”77  Senator Edward Kennedy of 
Massachusetts and Senator Michael Dewine of Ohio, who were skep-
tical about the passage of the RLUIPA bill and expressed several con-
cerns about RLUIPA, did not refer at all to eminent domain proceed-
ings and their relevance under the Act.78  The Senators’ failure to 
mention eminent domain is evidence that it was unlikely within the 
desired legislative scope and direction of the bill.79  Likewise, the leg-
 
 72 Brief for Defendant at 33, St. John’s United Church v. City of Chicago, 401 F. 
Supp. 2d 887 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (No. 05-4418) (on file with author) [hereinafter City of 
Chicago’s Brief].   
 73 Id. 
 74 See supra Part II.A.   
 75 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Reid). 
 76 Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 255 (W.D.N.Y. 
2005). See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. E1564 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2000) (statement of Rep. 
Hyde) (regarding “zoning conflicts between churches and cities”); see also 146 CONG. 
REC. E1564 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2000) (statement of Rep. Hyde) (pointing out that in 
the ten years prior to the Act’s enactment “zoning conflicts between churches and 
cities [had] become a leading church-state issue”); 146 CONG. REC. E1234--35 (daily 
ed. July 13, 2000) (statement of Rep. Canady) (noting instances where a municipality 
“intentionally changed a zone to exclude a church,” but containing no reference to 
eminent domain).  
 77 146 CONG. REC. E1563 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2000) (statement of Rep. Canady).  
     78 146 CONG. REC. S10992 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2000) (comments of Sen. Dewine and 
Sen. Kennedy). 
 79 146 CONG. REC. S10992 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2000) (comments of Sen. Dewine 
and Sen. Kennedy) (“I was concerned that the bill would have unintentionally im-
peded the ability of states and localities to protect the health and safety of children in 
a variety of ways . . . . I am relieved that the . . . version has a much more limited 
scope.”); 146 CONG. REC. S6688--89 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) (comments of Sen. Ken-
SCADUTO_FINALV3 4/11/2008  11:15:59 AM 
834 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:823 
 
                                                                                                                
islative history illustrates that the members of Congress sought to nar-
row the scope of RLUIPA so that it avoided “possible conflict with 
other civil rights protections, and those concerns were addressed.  
But among all these expressions of concern that served to narrow the 
Act, not a soul complained the RLUIPA would overreach by covering 
eminent domain laws as one type of ‘zoning law.’”80  Moreover, it is 
well settled that it is not the court’s proper function to add language 
to a statute in an effort to stretch its applicability.81
Tracing the history of RLUIPA and the recent district court cases 
evaluating the Act’s application to eminent domain proceedings is 
helpful, but not determinative, in analyzing whether an eminent do-
main proceeding is a land use regulation within the purview of 
RLUIPA.  The Supreme Court has not yet considered the question.  
Until that time, the resolution to the debate will be left open-ended 
and a religious institution’s protections under RLUIPA from eminent 
domain will be unpredictable.  Most notably, the St. John’s court al-
luded to what seems to be the most promising basis for applying 
RLUIPA to the review of eminent domain proceedings—a taking that 
occurs amidst the imposition of a land use regulation.82
III. TAKINGS AND LAND USE REGULATIONS UNDER RLUIPA 
This Part considers the arguments by proponents of each side of 
the debate.  As noted above, RLUIPA defines the term “land use 
regulation” as “a zoning or landmarking law, or the application of 
such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant’s use or development of 
land.”83  This Comment explores three possible resolutions to the 
 
nedy) (noting that authors of the RLUIPA bill “were mindful of not undermining 
existing laws intended to protect other important civil rights and civil liberties”). 
 80 Brief for Plaintiff, St. John’s United Church v. City of Chicago, No. 03-C3726 
(N.D. Ill. 2005) at 24 [hereinafter St. John’s Brief]; see 146 CONG. REC. H7190--91 
(daily ed. July 27, 2000) (comments of Rep. Nadler, Sen. Reid, Sen. Kennedy, and 
Sen. Dewine); 146 CONG. REC. H7190 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (comments of Rep. 
Nadler) (“I am aware of no opposition from any religious or civil rights or civil liber-
ties group . . . .”). 
 81 Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 255. 
 82 St. John’s United Church v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 899–901 
(N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 21914 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2007). 
 83 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5) 
(2000). 
The term “land use regulation” means a zoning or landmarking law, or 
the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant's use or 
development of land (including a structure affixed to land), if the 
claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other 
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question of whether the exercise of eminent domain is a land use 
regulation: (1) a taking is never a land use regulation under RLUIPA; 
(2) a taking is always a land use regulation under RLUIPA; or (3) a 
taking is within the scope of RLUIPA if it is employed in the imple-
mentation of a land use regulation.  Courts are just beginning to ex-
plore the question and are split as to the correct answer. 
A. A Taking is Never a Land Use Regulation Under RLUIPA 
A number of sources lend support to the proposition that a tak-
ing is not a per se land use regulation under RLUIPA—among oth-
ers, district court decisions, universal notions of state sovereign 
power, and the acknowledged differentiating characteristics between 
eminent domain actions and land use regulations.  While each theory 
differs slightly in substance, the significant weight of the obtainable 
evidence tips in favor of not applying RLUIPA to every eminent do-
main proceeding that concerns sacred land. 
1. District Court Analysis 
Examined first in St. John’s84 and again in Faith Temple Church v. 
Town of Brighton,85 the question of whether eminent domain proceed-
ings are per se land use regulations under RLUIPA has received judi-
cial attention.  Following St. John’s, the district court in Faith Temple 
also rejected the proposition that an eminent domain proceeding is 
per se a land use regulation.86  Central to the Faith Temple court’s rea-
soning was the nature of authority underlying a zoning law as op-
posed to an eminent domain proceeding.87  “[T]owns are authorized 
by statute to enact zoning laws ‘to regulate and restrict’” a property 
owner’s private use of land, while in contrast, local and state govern-
ments have the power to take land for the public use.88  Acknowledg-
ing that these are two distinct concepts of authority, albeit both in-
volving land, the Faith Temple court aptly noted a key distinction be-
tween eminent domain actions and land use regulations—the gov-
ernment uses its power over the land in very different ways.89  
 
property interest in the regulated land or a contract or option to ac-
quire such an interest. 
Id. 
 84 St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887. 
 85 405 F. Supp. 2d 250 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).   
 86 Id. at 256–57. 
 87 See id. at 253–56. 
 88 Id. at 254. 
 89 Id. 
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Further considering the differences between zoning and emi-
nent domain, the Faith Temple court considered it suspect that Con-
gress would interpret RLUIPA’s explicit statutory reference to zoning 
as a type of land use regulation automatically to include eminent 
domain actions as well.90  Congress proactively chose to limit the 
scope and application of the Act.91  Thus, because “[e]minent do-
main is hardly an arcane or little-known concept . . . the [c]ourt will 
not assume that Congress simply overlooked it when drafting 
RLUIPA.”92  The Faith Temple court asserted that a relationship to 
land use is not enough to bring it within the purview of RLUIPA.93  It 
is not enough to regard zoning and condemnation proceedings as 
synonymous merely because they both have the potential to affect the 
land and to restrict the uses to which the land may be put.94  Congress 
could have included both eminent domain and zoning within the 
coverage the Act, but it did not choose to do so and it is not the 
proper function of the court to “judicially amend RLUIPA to ‘correct’ 
Congress’s omission.”95
Scrutiny of the district court analysis identifies another facet of 
the debate.  Those who are in support of RLUIPA’s application to 
condemnation proceedings contend that § 2000cc-3(g) of RLUIPA 
provides evidence of congressional intent for broader Act application 
and protection.96  The provision reads: “[t]his chapter shall be con-
strued in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the 
maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Con-
stitution.”97  The St. John’s plaintiffs argued that the City defendants 
applied the wrong rule of construction when interpreting § 2000cc-
3(g).98  The plaintiffs contended that because RLUIPA is federal civil 
rights legislation, the provision should have been applied broadly so 
that it could best effectuate the purpose of the Act.99  Although the 
St. John’s court disagreed with the plaintiffs’ contention, it was aware 
of RLUIPA’s admonition that the Act was to be construed broadly in 
 
 90 Id. at 254–55. 
 91 Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 254–55. 
 92 Id. at 255. 
 93 Id. at 257–58. 
 94 Id. at 258. 
 95 Id. 
 96 See St. John’s Brief, supra note 80, at 23–24. 
 97 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) 
(2000). 
 98 St. John’s Brief, supra note 80, at 24. 
 99 Id. 
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favor of protecting religious exercise.  For that reason, the court 
stated that its holding “should not be taken to mean that all condem-
nation proceedings necessarily are outside the scope of RLUIPA.”100  
The court, in qualifying its statement in regard to the language of  
§ 2000cc-3(g), declared that the obligation to broadly protect reli-
gious exercise can only inflate to the extent permitted by the Act’s 
terms because “[s]uch language does not itself alter Congress’s ex-
press delineation of the statute’s reach.”101  The court asserted that to 
read the clause otherwise would violate basic rules of statutory con-
struction,102 for it is an accepted principle that a “definition which 
declares what a term ‘means’ . . . excludes any meaning that is not 
stated.”103  Furthermore, the St. John’s plaintiffs’ contention that “all 
condemnation proceedings are land use regulations dealing with zon-
ing . . . is not an attempt to construe the statute broadly but rather is 
an attempt to rewrite it.”104  Thus, for fear of other courts misconstru-
ing its holding, the St. John’s court clearly delineated the limits of its 
ruling. 
2. Eminent Domain Versus Land Use Regulations 
The differences between an eminent domain action and a land 
use regulation as used under RLUIPA are numerous.105  The chief 
difference between a land use regulation and an eminent domain 
proceeding is how the land is restricted.  A land use regulation in-
volves the government restricting how private parties may use the 
land, while an eminent domain proceeding involves a compelled 
transfer of private land to the public for the public benefit and use.106  
The “core of eminent domain power has nothing to do with the regu-
lation of the use of property by others, but instead provides property 
 
 100 St. John’s United Church v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 900 (N.D. Ill. 
2005), aff’d, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 21914 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2007) (“[A]n act to ac-
quire land (through eminent domain) and then to rezone it and transfer it might 
very well fall with[in] the reach of RLUIPA.”). 
 101 City of Chicago’s Brief, supra note 72, at 39 n.11.   
 102 See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183–84 (1993); Callanan v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961) (“[A] construction clause does not invite the court 
to apply the statute to new purposes that were never intended by Congress.  Such a 
clause, ‘as is true of any guide to statutory construction, only serves as an aid for re-
solving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one.’”).    
 103 Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 393 (1979) (quoting 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES 
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.07 (4th ed. Supp. 1978) (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
 104 St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 900. 
 105 City of Chicago’s Brief, supra note 72, at 34–37. 
 106 Id. at 34. 
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for the government’s own use.”107  In Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, the 
Supreme Court, declared that the taking of property enables the 
“proper performance of governmental functions.”108  Historically, 
eminent domain has been distinguished from “other forms of gov-
ernmental action that deprive persons of property values . . . by the 
fact that . . . the government puts the property taken to a specific, 
publicly mandated use.”109  Landmarking and zoning regulations do 
not change the ownership of the land in a way that allows the gov-
ernment to have complete control.  While such government actions 
may adjust how the land is used, they do not mandate that land be 
used only for the government’s chosen purpose and only by whom 
the government chooses; this differing degree of ownership is a vital 
distinction.110
 
 107 Id. at 35. 
 108 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924). 
 109 See Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119, 1183 
(1995). 
 110 See City of Chicago’s Brief, supra note 72, at 34–35.  When tracing the history 
and development of the government’s zoning power in contrast to the government’s 
eminent domain power, another difference between the two becomes apparent.  
Zoning is a generally modern invention, while eminent domain is a concept that 
predates the United States Constitution and has always been recognized as an “in-
herent right to the sovereign.”  Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. 
Supp. 2d 250, 254 n.3 (W.D.N.Y. 2005); see also E. Thirteenth St. Cmty. Ass’n v. N.Y. 
State Urban Dev. Corp., 641 N.E.2d 1368 (N.Y. 1994).
Another dissimilarity between zoning laws and eminent domain proceedings is 
the general purpose for which the two governmental actions are authorized.  
“[Z]oning statutes seek to protect ‘the welfare of the entire community’ by making a 
balanced and effective use of the available land and providing for the public need for 
varying types of uses and structures.”  E. Thirteenth St. Cmty. Ass'n, 641 N.E.2d at 1371 
(citations omitted).  While zoning laws will be found invalid if they “are clearly arbi-
trary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare,” eminent domain proceedings do not have to be for the 
public health, safety, etc.  Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272  U.S. 365, 395 (1926).  
The eminent domain public use requirement is much broader than that allowed for 
zoning measures.  The “primary concern of land use regulations is not economics, 
but the promotion of public health and safety and aesthetics,” while the concept and 
pertinence of economics is a budding aspect of eminent domain actions.  Julie M. 
Osborn, Note, RLUIPA’s Land Use Provision: Congress’ Unconstitutional Response to City of 
Boerne, 28 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 155, 174 (2004).  The Supreme Court deci-
sion in Kelo further verifies this distinction between zoning measures and eminent 
domain actions.  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  In warning about 
the incorrect fusing of the two categories of government’s power over land—zoning 
and eminent domain—the dissent in Kelo added that “whether the State can take 
property using the power of eminent domain is . . . distinct from the question 
whether it can regulate property pursuant to the police power.”  Id. at 519 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). 
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A further incongruity between eminent domain actions and land 
use regulations pertains to the nature of the inquiry involved in each 
action—individualized assessment versus non-individualized assess-
ment.  It is theorized that the Takings Clause is “designed to bar [the 
government] from forcing some people alone to bear the public bur-
dens, which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public 
as a whole.”111  Thus, condemnation proceedings individually assess 
each parcel of land subject to the government’s eminent domain 
power to ensure the constitutional requirements are satisfied and that 
the power of eminent domain is exercised non-discriminately.  To the 
contrary, zoning and landmarking laws are the types of government 
laws that characteristically do not involve individualized assess-
ments.112  Zoning measures generally apply to every property within a 
specific zoning area without a comprehensive assessment of each par-
cel of land.113  Zoning laws embody the policy judgments of local and 
state officials about what the best uses of private property are in a par-
ticular area.  Zoning ordinances “provide control over land use within 
a neighborhood and are part of a comprehensive plan for community 
development.”114  Notwithstanding the principle of non-
individualized assessment that traditionally applied to zoning enact-
ments, RLUIPA now requires the government to evaluate each prop-
erty with a religious affiliation individually and apart from other types 
of land prior to the enactment of a zoning plan.115  RLUIPA provides 
 
 111 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) (quoting 
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
 112 See City of Chicago’s Brief, supra note 72, at 36.  But see supra Part IV.C. 
 113 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997); cf. SELMI & KUSHNER, 
supra note 47, at 45 (“All of the flexibility devices have the common characteristic of 
focusing on the individual impacts from a particular development or use, rather than 
on the needs of the jurisdiction as a whole.”); Angela C. Carmella, Zoning of Religious 
Uses, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN LAW 574, 574 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2000).  Carmella 
argues: 
This assumption of general applicability is incorrect.  Built into zoning 
laws are numerous mechanisms for exceptions and special considera-
tion.  Variances, hardship exemptions, and special permits are among 
the many discretionary mechanisms present in land use ordinances; 
these are necessary to provide flexibility in an area subject to constant 
pressures for change. Under Smith, it seems that statutory regimes 
which contain exemption mechanisms (with government making “in-
dividualized assessments” in discretionary fashion) may continue to en-
joy the highest level of judicial review, the compelling interest test.  
The analysis is thus not as simple as Justice Kennedy . . . suggests. 
Carmella, Zoning of Religious Uses, at 574. 
 114 See 83 AM. JUR. 2d Zoning and Planning § 3 (2006). 
 115 See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 
(2000). 
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religious institutions protection from discriminatory zoning measures 
in a manner similar to the constitutionally mandated protections and 
individualized assessments of the Takings Clause. 
The dissimilarity between the level of community involvement 
necessary and ordinarily implicated in the execution of each power is 
notable.  In eminent domain proceedings, there is greater public in-
volvement and far greater scrutiny by the public and various public 
officials.116  These checks and balances are needed to prevent abuse 
of this constitutional right.117  On the other hand, zoning and land-
marking laws do not have constitutionally established checks and bal-
ances set in place.  Although religious institutions often receive a 
safeguard from zoning measures due to their non-conforming use 
status,118 many situations exist where that status does not protect the 
religious institution from government intrusion.  Therefore, a federal 
statute such as RLUIPA is disputably necessary to prevent abuse of 
religious actors.119  Furthermore, zoning and landmarking laws are 
relatively easy for towns to enact, while condemnation proceedings 
are costly and come at a literal price to the government—the fair 
market value of the property.120  Arguably, zoning and landmarking 
regulations also have more oppressive implications for property own-
ers, in that property values are often lowered without compensation 
by the government.  While governments in eminent domain proceed-
ings are subject to the constitutionally mandated payment of just 
compensation, the government is able simply to “take” land through 
zoning regulations without compensating the property owner.121
 
 116 City of Chicago’s Brief, supra note 72, at 41. 
 117 Id. 
 118 SELMI & KUSHNER, supra note 47, at 67–70.  The idea behind a non-conforming 
use is to let a property owner’s land use continue under the new zoning plan—even 
though such use would not be permitted under the plan—because the use existed 
prior to the zoning measure’s enactment and it would be unfair to deprive the prop-
erty owner of his or her expected use of such property.  Id.  Ideally, any expansion of 
the non-conforming property or of the property’s non-conforming use will be re-
stricted and eventually removed.  Id. 
 119 City of Chicago’s Brief, supra note 72, at 41. 
 120 See United States v. 6.45 Acres of Land, 409 F.3d 139, 145 (3rd Cir. 2005); Faith 
Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 256 (W.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 121 City of Chicago’s Brief, supra note 72, at 41.  An interesting debate in this area 
involves Justice Holmes’s holding in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, that land use 
regulations that go “too far” can actually constitute a taking.  260 U.S. 393, 415–16 
(1922); see SELMI & KUSHNER, supra note 47, at 315–16.  But see SELMI & KUSHNER, supra 
note 47, at 317 (“[A] number of scholars have suggested that, based on the historical 
record, a ‘taking’ meant an actual expropriation of property.  The effects of land use 
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3. State Sovereign Power Considered 
Notions of state sovereign power buttress the preceding argu-
ments and set the foundation for a supplemental line of reasoning in 
favor of finding eminent domain outside the boundaries of RLUIPA 
protection.  While this argument is not grounded on finding an emi-
nent domain proceeding to be outside the RLUIPA definition of a 
land use regulation, it nonetheless provides some insight as to why 
eminent domain actions would not have been included under the Act 
in the first place, regardless of whether an eminent domain proceed-
ing could ever be deemed a land use regulation.122
Eminent domain power is one traditionally reserved to the 
states—“it is intimately involved with sovereign prerogative.”123  Thus, 
cognitive of state eminent domain power, it is possible that Congress 
purposefully did not extend RLUIPA to eminent domain actions so as 
to not interfere with the state’s power to take religious or non-
religious lands for the public benefit.  And, “[a]bsent an unmistaka-
bly clear expression of intent to alter the usual constitutional balance 
between the states and the federal government, [the courts] will in-
terpret a statute to preserve rather than destroy the States’ substantial 
sovereign powers.”124
 
regulation thus would not result in takings . . . an excessive land use regulation is 
simply an invalid regulation.”). 
 122 Cf. Storzer & Picarello, supra note 16, at 1000.  The view that RLUIPA infringes 
on a state’s right to exercise its power of eminent domain is not widespread.  Storzer 
and Picarello dispel the notion that RLUIPA cannot supersede this state power: 
RLUIPA aims to assure that all courts (federal and state alike) purport-
ing to apply federal constitutional protections do not ignore their con-
tinuing vitality.  To claim that this codification of existing federal limits 
on local discretionary power represents some novel infringement on 
States’ rights is to mischaracterize not only the statute and the constitu-
tional jurisprudence it enforces, but also the history of the States’ con-
cern for local abuses of religious freedom. 
Id.  They suggest that RLUIPA’s purpose is not to inhibit a state’s right to exercise its 
powers, but to assist the states in their protection of the religious freedoms they ap-
parently deem so important.  From this line of reasoning, it can be inferred that not 
all eminent domain proceedings are to be automatically approved simply because 
the power to exercise a taking is one traditionally held by the state itself.  Thus, while 
the state sovereignty argument has potential, it is not necessarily the strongest line of 
attack against RLUIPA’s application to condemnation proceedings. 
 123 La. Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959); see Searl v. Sch. 
Dist. No. 2 in Lake County, 133 U.S. 553, 562 (1890) (stating that the eminent do-
main right “is the offspring of political necessity, and is inseparable from sover-
eignty”). 
 124 Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
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The St. John’s plaintiffs alluded to the states’ sovereign power ar-
gument in their trial brief.125  They contended that the city defen-
dants incorrectly applied the principles of Gregory v. Ashcroft.126  Only 
state functions that “go to the heart of the representative govern-
ment”127 are protected by the Ashcroft decision.128  The plaintiffs as-
serted that such a limiting phrase would hardly include the taking of 
a cemetery for the expansion of an interstate transportation system 
that was subsidized largely by federal government and had a tremen-
dous effect on interstate commerce.129  Despite the plaintiffs’ argu-
ment cutting against the state sovereign power theory, the court, by 
not explicitly addressing whether eminent domain actions fall under 
the type of Ashcroft governmental functions that are protected from 
federal statutory interference, left open the possibility that eminent 
domain actions are out of the reach of federal statutory schemes such 
as RLUIPA due to the power of the sovereign state. 
A number of authorities lend support to the proposition that a 
taking is not a per se land use regulation under RLUIPA.  The signifi-
cant weight of the obtainable information, as will be clear by the end 
of this Comment, obviously tips in favor of not applying RLUIPA to 
eminent domain proceedings.130  Nevertheless, as the debate is just 
commencing, the arguments in favor of this position are still malle-
able, and this faction’s strengths and weaknesses will inevitably be 
tested as the debate roars on.131    
                                                
 
 
 125 St. John’s Brief, supra note 80, at 24. 
 126 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (affirming the authority of state citizens to determine the 
qualifications of important government officials, a state function protected by the 
Tenth Amendment); St. John’s Brief, supra note 80, at 24.   
 127 St. John’s Brief, supra note 80, at 24.  The plaintiffs in St. John’s argue that the 
City’s rule of construction “would have the Court interpret federal statutes to avoid 
any interference with state governmental functions which, Defendants claim, in-
cludes eminent domain power.  Yet nowhere is such a rule announced in Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, on which the City relies.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 128 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461. 
 129 St. John’s Brief, supra note 80, at 25. 
 130 A pro-government effect of a taking not being considered a land use regulation 
is that once the city acquires title to the land via eminent domain there will no 
longer be a RLUIPA claim.  Once the city acquires title, the RLUIPA claim self-
destructs.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-5(5).   
 131 Carmella, supra note 30, at 579. 
Private covenants [and defeasible estates] are used not only to exclude 
religious uses in these indirect ways but also to perpetuate religious 
uses . . . . [They] often function just like zoning restrictions. . . . 
[B]ecause they do not invoke state action, these private agreements are 
not subject to constitutional scrutiny in the way that zoning is. 
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B. A Taking Is Always a Land Use Regulation Under RLUIPA 
The proposition that a taking is considered a land use regulation 
under the RLUIPA is not well supported by many authorities.  Those 
in favor of RLUIPA’s application to eminent domain proceedings de-
sire a RLUIPA strict scrutiny analysis to be applied to condemnation 
proceedings that burden religious exercise.  Thus, if eminent domain 
is encompassed within the protection of the Act, the government will 
have to meet a higher standard of review to take land used by reli-
gious institutions. 
The primary authority in support of this view is the decision by 
the United States District Court for the Central District of California 
in Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress Development Agency.132  Without 
much discussion, the court assumed that an eminent domain pro-
ceeding was within the bounds of a RLUIPA land use regulation sim-
ply because the government action restricted the Christian Center’s 
use of land—an assumption that blurred the important distinction 
between the various ways in which land can be restricted by govern-
ment interference.133  Although the court’s analysis was possibly 
founded on an improper interpretation of the statute,134 the court 
nevertheless found that the condemnation proceeding at issue was 
within the scope of RLUIPA, and thus the taking was invalid under 
the Act.135
In addition, the Cottonwood court maintained that Congress, by 
its passage of RLUIPA, “conclusively determined the national public 
policy that religious land uses are to be guarded from interference by 
local governments to the maximum extent permitted by the Constitu-
 
Id.  Although eminent domain proceedings are outside the power of the individual 
land owner, an interesting question is the extent to which religious institutions can 
protect themselves from government actions by private land covenants.  Perhaps, 
the way legally to effectuate [the desire to not have a church built next 
door] is by private mutual covenants between property owners impos-
ing appropriate servitudes on the land.  We must not “employ the new 
device of zoning to make exclusive districts much more exclusive.”  [I]t 
is [not] a proper function of government to interfere in the name of 
the public to exclude churches from residential districts for the pur-
pose of securing to adjacent landowners the benefits of exclusive resi-
dential restrictions. 
O’Brien v. Chicago, 105 N.E.2d 917, 921 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952) (quoting Ohio v. Jo-
seph, 39 N.E.2d 515, 524 (1942)) (citation omitted).  
 132 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 133 Id. at 1222.  Note the distinction between the use restrictions of a permit denial 
and the use restrictions of a condemnation proceeding. 
 134 See St. John’s United Church v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 900 (N.D. 
Ill. 2005), aff’d, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 21914 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2007). 
 135 Cottonwood Christian Ctr., 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1222. 
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tion.”136  From this concept it can be inferred that the court also 
found protection in the Constitution for preventing this taking, al-
though such protections were not clearly set forth in the opinion.  
Conceivably, because the land was being transferred from private 
ownership to a use that was debatably not a constitutionally protected 
public use—a private retail corporation—the condemnation proceed-
ing ran contrary to the public’s interest.137  Thus, it is possible that the 
taking could have been prohibited on those grounds.138  Needless to 
say, the Cottonwood court’s line of reasoning has been sharply ques-
tioned and would likely not hold up if dissected by an appellate court 
today. 
Professor Shelley Ross Saxer supports a second justification139 for 
RLUIPA’s application to eminent domain proceedings.140  Saxer con-
tends that even though an eminent domain action is not specifically 
within the classification of a zoning or landmarking law as defined 
under RLUIPA, excluding eminent domain proceedings from the 
Act’s reach would be inappropriate considering the context in which 
the definition of land use regulation was formulated.141  She argues 
that the bill narrowly described a land use regulation in order “to ad-
dress concerns about the potential for civil rights violations . . . [but] 
there is no indication that Congress changed the definition language 
in order to restrict the type of land use decision subject to 
RLUIPA.”142  Accordingly, she argues it would be a mistake to parse 
 
 136 Id. at 1230–31. 
 137 Id. at 1231. 
 138 Id. 
 139 The particular class of people who benefit from a taking can possibly form the 
basis for a third argument in favor of applying RLUIPA to eminent domain proceed-
ings.  Generally, a condemnation action benefits the majority of the public, while a 
land use regulation—for example, a zoning or landmarking law—is to the detriment 
of a minority group of landowners.  Arguably, a smaller number of interests are at 
stake with a land use regulation, because it is not designed to benefit the majority of 
the public, whereas eminent domain proceedings are specifically undertaken for the 
advantage of the public majority.  Since land use regulations only affect a minority of 
individual property owners, it seems fair to give a religious institution affected by a 
land use regulation some additional protection.  It seems more viable to award the 
minority interest holders some leniency, especially when they are asking for the leni-
ency in order to protect a value that ultimately serves the majority—namely First 
Amendment religious freedom of expression. 
 140 Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain Actions Targeting First Amendment Land Uses, 
69 MO. L. REV. 653 (2004). 
 141 Id. at 668–69. 
 142 Id. 
SCADUTO_FINALV3 4/11/2008  11:15:59 AM 
2008] COMMENT 845 
                                                
the language in a way that would exclude eminent domain proceed-
ings from the reach of the Act’s land use regulation definition.143
Support for the proposition that eminent domain proceedings 
should be considered land use regulations under RLUIPA is scarce.144  
Nonetheless, it is important to concentrate on the most potentially 
successful arguments on this side of the debate.  Being that Supreme 
Court jurisprudence is non-existent, and fundamental scholarship is 
outdated, unfounded, or inapplicable, this pro-side of the debate is 
not yet condemned. 
C. A Taking Is Within RLUIPA if Carried Out in the Implementation 
of a Land Use Regulation  
An intermediate approach to the question of RLUIPA’s applica-
tion to eminent domain proceedings may be the most effective ar-
gument for religious institutions to make.  Perhaps by limiting 
RLUIPA’s applicability to situations where eminent domain is used as 
part of a plan that effectuates a land use regulation, a middle ground 
can be achieved so that governments and religious institutions alike 
would be pleased.  Focusing on the Act’s language and a common-
sense construction of it, it seems that an acceptable way to resolve the 
current predicament would be to allow eminent domain proceedings 
to fall within RLUIPA’s purview only when they occur as part of a 
plan that ultimately implements a land use regulation. 
Allowing RLUIPA to apply to eminent domain actions in these 
certain instances would offer religious institutions the protection that 
Congress deemed them worthy of receiving when it first enacted 
RLUIPA.145  Religious institutions often qualify as non-conforming 
uses and are temporarily exempt from local zoning plans.146  Because 
non-conforming use status by itself offers religious institutions a pro-
tection from potentially devastating zoning measures, the non-
conforming use status practically makes RLUIPA inapplicable and 
unnecessary.  A government may, however, attempt to use its eminent 
domain power over the non-conforming use property in a way that 
 
 143 Id. at 669. 
 144 Adverse possession against cemeteries is not permitted, absent evidence of 
complete and actual abandonment of the burial ground site.  See Mary L. Clark, 
Treading on Hallowed Ground: Implications for Property Law and Critical Theory of Land 
Associated with Human Death and Burial, 94 KY. L.J. 487, 496 (2005).  Arguably, this 
rule evidences a general governmental intent to protect religious sites, and would 
therefore compliment the notion that an eminent domain action is a land use regu-
lation under RLUIPA.  See id. 496–98.  
 145 See supra Part II.C. 
 146 See SELMI & KUSHNER, supra note 47, at 68–70. 
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would circumvent the religious institution’s non-conforming use 
status.  This would, in effect, turn restricted non-conforming use 
property into unrestricted property that could then fit freely into a 
zoning plan.  Moreover, without special protection, religious property 
that is not classified as a non-conforming use would still be subject to 
the government’s eminent domain power.147  In an effort to reach its 
land use goals, the government may opt to condemn the religious 
property in order to gain control of it, instead of using zoning meas-
ures that are subject to strict RLUIPA scrutiny.  In a situation like 
this—when the taking is actually being done for the ultimate imple-
mentation of a land use regulation—RLUIPA should apply to protect 
the religious institution from the taking. 
The intent to include eminent domain proceedings within 
RLUIPA’s reach in this particular way is evidenced by the particular 
choice of language in § 2000cc(a).148  Arguably, by selecting the word 
“implement” Congress expected that the “means the government uses 
to ‘implement’ a land use regulation may [also] substantially burden 
religious exercise.”149  Thus, although the means used by the govern-
ment may not qualify as a per se land use regulation, if the end is a 
land use regulation then the means used by the government to put 
that land use regulation into action may actually be covered under 
RLUIPA.150  Applying similar reasoning to the question of whether or 
not an eminent domain proceeding is a land use regulation under 
the Act, it could effectively be argued that when eminent domain is 
used as a precursor to a zoning measure—for example, the imple-
mentation of a zoning development plan—then it is a means used to 
reach the end and is therefore covered under RLUIPA. 
The above rationale helps resolve some of the discrepancies sur-
rounding the debate because “[v]ery often a land use regulation by 
itself may not substantially burden religious exercise, but the means 
 
 147 Arguably, RLUIPA standards afford greater protection to religious institutions 
than the constitutional requirements of a taking.  While eminent domain proceed-
ings are subject to the public use and compensation requirements, RLUIPA stan-
dards are more stringent, requiring a compelling governmental interest and the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest.  See Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2000).  
 148 § 2000cc(a). 
 149 Brief for The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Plaintiff-Appellant at 5, Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, No. 06-0354-cv 
(W.D.N.Y. 2005) (emphasis added), available at http://www.becketfund.org/files/ 
1dec2.pdf [hereinafter Becket Fund Faith Temple Brief]. 
 150 See id. at 5. 
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used to implement that regulation do burden religious exercise.”151  
The St. John’s plaintiffs apply this justification broadly when they 
maintain that the city’s authorization to change the use of land from 
religious cemetery to airport property was an act of zoning because 
the ordinance at issue constituted an “attempt by a government to 
regulate the use of a piece of property.”152  While the plaintiffs take 
this line of reasoning a step beyond where most courts will likely be 
prepared to go, the justification behind the rationale is sound. 
The way a court frames the issue can affect the RLUIPA analysis 
in regard to eminent domain proceedings.  The Becket Fund for Re-
ligious Liberty, in its amicus brief in support of Faith Temple Church, 
insists that the Faith Temple153 court erred when it failed to ask 
whether the city’s use of eminent domain “implement[ed] a land use 
regulation,” as RLUIPA’s language instructs, and instead asked 
“whether eminent domain proceedings were themselves a land use 
regulation within the meaning of RLUIPA.”154  Claiming that this type 
of analysis by the courts will not protect religious institutions “from 
the means used to implement land use regulations unless those 
means are themselves land use regulations,” the Becket Fund argued 
for a more strategic application of the RLUIPA implementation lan-
guage.155  The Becket Fund contended that interpreting RLUIPA in 
this stingy way in effect reads the word “implements” out of the Act’s 
text and thus violates common principles of statutory construction.156  
This type of analysis in fact narrows the Act, rather than “construing 
it in favor of broad protection of religious exercise” as § 2000cc-3(g) 
of RLUIPA requires.157  Proponents of RLUIPA’s application to emi-
nent domain proceedings argue that the “Court should not sheath 
RLUIPA’s sword in a context where religious institutions are most 
vulnerable.”158  By focusing on the means used to execute a land use 
regulation, courts will be more responsive to the role that the gov-
ernment’s eminent domain power plays in land use regulation 
schemes and ultimately more likely to award religious institutions 
their deserved protection under RLUIPA. 
 
 151 Id. 
 152 Second Amended Complaint for St. John’s United Church, St. John’s United 
Church v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, No. 03-C-3726 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (on 
file with author).  
 153 405 F. Supp. 2d 250 (W.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 154 Becket Fund Faith Temple Brief, supra note 149, at 7. 
 155 Id. at 8. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 8. 
 158 Id. at 15. 
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Limiting RLUIPA’s applicability to situations where eminent 
domain is used in the implementation of a land use regulation is an 
intermediate scheme that has been endorsed by some courts.159  This 
approach poses a great danger to the government’s power of eminent 
domain, yet it poses an even greater promise to religious institutions 
for protection from such power.  As the discussion continues over 
whether a land use regulation under the statute encompasses con-
demnation proceedings, the debate may instead switch gears and fo-
cus on how far the courts are willing to take the “in implementation 
of a land use regulation” language as a means of bringing eminent 
domain within RLUIPA’s reach. 
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS BEING 
CONSIDERED OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF RLUIPA 
The implications of RLUIPA’s application to eminent domain 
actions will be widespread.  However, the ramifications of eminent 
domain not being considered a land use regulation under RLUIPA 
are especially extensive considering the particular vulnerability of re-
ligious institutions.  The consequences of such a ruling fuel the fire 
of the debate.  Religious institutions hold a significant place in the 
history and culture of this country.  Proponents of RLUIPA’s appli-
cation to eminent domain proceedings argue that holding land use 
regulations outside the scope of RLUIPA will encourage local gov-
ernments to “declare open season on the taking of religious property 
of all kinds.”160  These proponents postulate that, when viewed in con-
junction with the tax-free status of religious institutions, the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Kelo v. City of New London161 will have tre-
mendous implications on the government’s tendency to take land 
from religious institutions.  On the other hand, some scholars argue 
that religious institutions have political influence over local govern-
ments, which will prevent such dramatic consequences from occur-
ring because this political influence actually encourages governments 
to actively avoid condemning religious property.162
 
 
 159 See St. John’s United Church v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 900 (N.D. 
Ill. 2005), aff’d, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 21914 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2007). 
 160 Becket Fund Faith Temple Brief, supra note 149, at 4. 
 161 545 U.S. 469, 518 (2005). 
 162 See infra Part IV.C. 
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A. The Significance of Religious Expression 
Private property is used by religious institutions in a variety of 
ways.163  “Property provides a physical reality through which the 
church manifests its religious structure.”164 Churches serve as the 
meeting place for most religions and as the foundation of religious 
practice.165  As a result of the uniqueness of religious property use, 
religious institutions will be particularly devastated by the power of 
eminent domain.166  Regulations that prevent a church from existing 
will inhibit the free and unhampered exercise of religion.167  More-
over, religious expression and a religious institution’s duty to the 
public are inevitably burdened when cemeteries, soup kitchens, 
schools, and other socially advantageous functions that religious insti-
tutions provide are condemned.168
When the government seeks, through exercise of eminent do-
main, to dictate where a religious institution may or may not exist, 
it inevitably treads on that religious institution’s autonomy and 
expression . . . . Conforming religious institutions to the govern-
ment’s vision of the “proper place” for such institutions, in effect, 
imposes the government’s vision of their “proper role.”169
A look back on our history at the great many wars that were 
fought in the name of religion can provide some insight as to the 
depth of the value we are seeking to protect, namely the freedom to 
express and practice religion.170  RLUIPA’s application to eminent 
 
 163 Carmella, supra note 30, at 566. 
[A] 1994 Report on the Survey of Religious Organizations at the Na-
tional Level, conducted by the Northwestern University Survey Labora-
tory and DePaul Law School’s Center for Church/State Studies, shows 
that nearly all churches hold religious gatherings at least once a week; 
additionally, two-thirds of religious organizations engage in social ser-
vice or welfare activities; more than eighty percent are involved in edu-
cation; nearly sixty percent provide recreation or social activities; 
eighty-five percent are involved in communications; one-third have re-
treat centers; and forty percent have cemeteries. 
Id. 
 164 See id. at 565. 
 165 Becket Fund Faith Temple Brief, supra note 149, at 10. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Brief Amicus Curiae of The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty in Support of 
Petitioners at *5, Kelo v. City of New London, U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 801 (2004) 
(No. 04-108) [hereinafter Becket Fund Kelo Brief]. 
 170 ReligiousTolerance.Org, Basic Information on Religious Tolerance & Conflict, 
http://www.religioustolerance.org/rel_tol1.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2007). 
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domain proceedings will become just one more battle won or lost in 
the ongoing struggle for religious freedom. 
B. The Kelo Effect 
If eminent domain actions are outside the umbrella of RLUIPA 
protection, the Kelo decision could inevitably increase the propensity 
with which local governments legally exercise their eminent domain 
powers.171  Because of the Supreme Court’s skillful pronouncement 
that economic development and revenue generation are valid public 
purposes under the Takings Clause,172 it is argued that municipalities 
now have an unprecedented power to condemn private property for 
purely economic reasons under their constitutional power of eminent 
domain.173  Nevertheless, the governmental reaction to Kelo may not 
be as drastic as envisioned.  Many states have imposed stricter limits 
than federal law as to what constitutes a public use, the primary goal 
behind these narrowed parameters being to make eminent domain 
unavailable for redevelopment projects.174
Nevertheless, Kelo’s broadening of public use to include eco-
nomic takings could presumably lead to an increased number of 
condemnation proceedings against religious institutions for eco-
nomic development purposes.175  Religious institutions are almost 
universally non-profit and tax-exempt,176 and as a consequence they 
normally do not generate much revenue for their local govern-
ments.177  To the disadvantage of religious institutions, the class of 
private properties eligible for an economic taking “in the name of 
generating additional tax revenue is more limited . . . . [Eligibility] is 
dependent on the nature of the present use of the property, the 
identity of the owner, or both.”178  Consequently, by the nature of the 
private property use religious institutions enjoy, such institutions and 
the land they use for religious purposes—for example, cemetery 
land—fit perfectly within the category of private property available 
 
 171 See Becket Fund Kelo Brief, supra note 169, at *2. 
 172 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005). 
 173 Becket Fund Kelo Brief, supra note 169, at *3. 
 174 John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 
789 (2006). 
 175 Becket Fund Kelo Brief, supra note 169, at *2. 
 176 Id. 
 177 See id. at *18 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 689 
(1970)). 
 178 Id. at *16 n.21. 
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for economic development and revenue generation.179  According to 
the Kelo ruling, it now seems that revenue-hungry governments are 
free to use their power of eminent domain “to implement land use 
plans that call for achieving economic development by replacing tax-
exempt religious uses with tax revenue generating commercial 
uses.”180  Under a system that favors “for-profit tax-generating busi-
nesses” over “non-profit, tax-exempt property owners,”181 religious 
institutions will become easy targets for a government’s exercise of its 
eminent domain power.182  And, more and more, religious institu-
tions will be found in the middle of redevelopment plans, for it is of-
ten too tempting for a city to pass up an opportunity to generate 
more tax revenue by transferring religious property to private devel-
opers.183
The incentives underlying the Kelo decision trigger the question 
of whether economic development is more important than property 
rights—a question the Kelo majority implicitly answered in the af-
firmative.  Conceivably, economic development is a public use more 
worthy of protection than church rights.184  A key aspect of the con-
tinuing debate is which use serves the best public purpose—tax gen-
eration and revenue boosting, or tax-exempt religious institutions? 185  
Reaching a result where religious institutions are valued less than tax 
generation is ironic “because religious institutions are generally ex-
empted from taxes precisely because they are deemed to be ‘beneficial 
and stabilizing influences in community life.’”186  The United States 
 
 179 Id. at *7 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 673). 
 180 Becket Fund Faith Temple Brief, supra note 149, at 9–12 (listing examples of 
municipalities targeting religious institutions for eminent domain proceedings—
primarily to “implement land use plans that they claim will generate tax revenue and 
economic development”). 
 181 Becket Fund Kelo Brief, supra note 169, at *7. 
 182 Id. at *8.  Perhaps, even if eminent domain does not fall within the statute, the 
taking might still be unjustified if the public benefit of the church/cemetery out-
weighs the public use the city is seeking to create through its power of eminent do-
main. 
 183 Becket Fund Faith Temple Brief, supra note 149, at 9. 
 184 Jerry Falwell, Eminent Domain Knocking on Church’s Door, THE CONSERVATIVE 
VOICE, (Jan. 21, 2006), http://www.theconservativevoice.com/article/11703.html 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2007).   
 185 In theory, if the public use is great enough that a taking is deemed appropriate 
in the first place, then should the taking not be appropriate regardless of what needs 
to be taken?  Along a similar line of reasoning, then even if eminent domain does 
not fall within the bounds of RLUIPA, could the taking still be unjustified if the pub-
lic benefit of the church or cemetery is found to outweigh the public use the city is 
seeking to create through its power of eminent domain? 
 186 Becket Fund Kelo Brief, supra note 169, at *7 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of 
New York, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970)) (emphasis added). 
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has a long tradition in which religious institutions provide necessary 
public goods to the community and serve the people through soup 
kitchens, food drives, spiritual guidance, and the like.187  Accordingly, 
the “government grants exemptions to religious organizations be-
cause they uniquely contribute to the pluralism of American society 
by their religious activities.”188  Social science tells us that churches 
and other religious institutions do in fact promote the general public 
interest and the common welfare.189  While affirming the constitu-
tionality of tax exemptions for religious entities, the Supreme Court 
recognized that certain entities “exist in a harmonious relationship to 
the community at large, and . . . foster its moral or mental improve-
ment, [and thus they] should not be inhibited in their activities by . . 
. the hazard of loss of those properties for nonpayment of taxes.”190  
Nevertheless, the property rights of religious institutions remain at 
risk due to the Kelo decision and the absence of a federal statutory 
scheme—like RLUIPA—designed to protect religious institutions and 
their land counterparts from the government’s selective power of 
eminent domain.191
C. Politics as a Sword for Religious Institutions 
Interestingly, some respected scholars argue that governments 
actually avoid using their power of eminent domain over religious 
institutions, since governments reasonably prefer the course of action 
that will generate the least amount of public outcry and resistance. 192  
Nicole Stelle Garnett predicts that governments are “most likely to 
avoid high subjective value property owned by the politically con-
nected.”193  Professor Garnett ascertains that takers have strong incen-
tives to simply avoid the exercise of eminent domain over land hold-
ing high subjective value, namely land belonging to religious institu-
 
 187 See Storzer & Picarello, supra note 16, at 930. 
 188 Walz, 397 U.S. at 689. 
 189 Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Schulte, 172 N.E.2d 39, 43 (Ind. 1961). 
 190 Walz, 397 U.S. at 672 (citations omitted). 
 191 Cf. Jeff Johnson, Eminent Domain: Churches Targeted by the Bulldozers, CNSNEWS. 
COM, July 15, 2005, http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewNation.asp?Page=//Nation// 
archive//200507//NAT20050715a.html.  Johnson argues that the Kelo decision is 
not as devastating to the property rights of religious institutions because of the 
strength of the First Amendment constitutional protections, as well as other federal 
and state laws.  Id. 
 192 Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 101, 103, 116 (2006).  Planners for a roadway in Chicago “assiduously” 
avoided the taking and ultimate demolition of over 400 churches.  Id. at 103. 
 193 Id. at 117. 
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tions.194  Since development plans often are flexible, governments are 
inclined to use this flexibility in a manner that “minimize[s] subjec-
tive losses,” and they often achieve this by utilizing alternate parcels 
of land—frequently, parcels of land belong to non-religiously affili-
ated owners.195
Inevitably, politics have a strong influence over a government’s 
decision to exercise its eminent domain power over religious prop-
erty.196  Garnett maintains that governments often opt not to take re-
ligious property for fear of the political fallout resulting from bad 
publicity and the inevitable holdout situation.197  Increasingly, reli-
gious institutions are able to considerably influence local politics and 
land use decision-making in their communities.198  Some commenta-
tors even suggest that the political process effectively polices the gov-
ernment’s exercise of its eminent domain power.199  Strikingly, “[a] 
similar assumption is reflected in the Supreme Court’s deferential 
public use review: the court assumes that the political process is bet-
ter equipped than the judiciary to determine when an exercise of 
eminent domain will serve the public interest.”200  Concerns for po-
tential Establishment Clause violations underlie the ever-present ten-
sion between the numerous societal benefits that religious institutions 
offer and the tremendous political influence such organizations have 
in the community.201  Even without RLUIPA, many local governments 
grant religious institutions land use exemptions and cater to the or-
ganizations’ interests in growth and development plans.202
In addition, it has been asserted that the political power of some 
religious institutions can influence the government’s exercise of emi-
nent domain.203  Thus, while religious institutions are usually the most 
vulnerable targets for eminent domain actions, they are not always at 
the losing end of the proceedings.  A government will often take pri-
vate land by its power of eminent domain and subsequently transfer 
 
 194 Id. at 111. 
 195 Id.  
 196 Id. at 117. 
 197 See Garnett, supra note 192, at 104. 
 198 Nicholas William Haddad, Public Use or Private Benefit? The Post-Kelo Intersection 
of Religious Land Use and the Public Use Doctrine, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1105, 1131 (2006) 
(discussing influence of Camden Churches Organized for People, a nonprofit group, 
over Camden’s redevelopment during the fiscal crisis of 2001). 
 199 See Garnett, supra note 192, at 115. 
 200 Id. 
 201 See Haddad, supra note 198, at 1132. 
 202 Id. at 1133. 
 203 See Garnett, supra note 192. 
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that land to religious organizations.204  Moreover, “[p]owerful . . . re-
ligious institutions . . . can use eminent domain to dominate land use 
decision making in areas populated by the politically vulnerable.”205  
Given this possibility, citizens in the aforementioned areas may actu-
ally be in favor of applying RLUIPA to eminent domain actions.  
Heightened judicial scrutiny of condemnation proceedings—namely 
by the application of RLUIPA—may be an effective means to “ensure 
that public benefits indeed flow from a challenged condemnation, 
thus reducing the potential for religious interests to dominate land 
use decision making while still permitting the public to continue to 
benefit from the services offered by such interests.”206  Thus, even 
though religious institutions are often the most vulnerable targets of 
eminent domain actions, there may be some situations where the citi-
zens—not the religious institutions—would most benefit from 
RLUIPA’s application to condemnation proceedings.  
D. Heightened Level of Scrutiny Regardless 
Ultimately, advocates of RLUIPA’s application to eminent do-
main proceedings desire such a result for the sole purpose of subject-
ing governments to a strict scrutiny analysis when they attempt to 
condemn religious property.  Generally, they are advocating for a 
higher level of scrutiny to be applied to eminent domain proceedings 
that burden religious institutions.  In determining the constitutional-
ity of condemnation proceedings under the Free Exercise Clause, it is 
held that government actions, such as eminent domain proceedings, 
that openly discriminate against religious uses are unconstitutional.207  
On the other hand, eminent domain actions that incidentally affect 
religious uses will only face a strict scrutiny analysis if they are indi-
vidualized assessments.208  It is asserted by some that since eminent 
domain actions almost always require individualized determinations, 
they are not “generally applicable laws”209 and will therefore be sub-
ject to strict scrutiny review regardless of RLUIPA’s application.210  If 
the government actions do not involve individualized assessments, 
then they are generally applicable laws and will only be subject to a 
 
 204 Haddad, supra note 198, at 1108. 
 205 Id. at 1141–42. 
 206 See id. at 1142. 
 207 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). 
 208 See id. 
 209 See id. at 886. 
 210 See Saxer, supra note 140, at 678–80. 
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rational basis test.  These laws of general applicability will easily pass 
rational basis review and will continue to burden religious practice.211  
Coincidentally, most land use regulations that burden religious exer-
cise do not fall under Smith’s “neutral laws of general applicability” 
category either, and accordingly are subject to strict scrutiny review.212  
Because of the First Amendment, land use regulations that burden 
religious exercise are usually subject to the heightened level of review 
that RLUIPA seeks to provide anyway, and eminent domain proceed-
ings—because of the constitutionally mandated individualized nature 
of the assessment—are also indirectly subject to a RLUIPA-like level 
of review.  Consequently, this begs the question of the actual necessity 
of RLUIPA in the face of First Amendment protections. 
E. State Evasion of RLUIPA 
It is worth noting that a government may evade the preemptive 
force of RLUIPA by changing or eliminating the practice or policy 
that leads to the substantial burden on the religious institution.213  
Moreover, the local government can argue that any burden on the 
exercise of religion imposed through the exploitation of their emi-
nent domain power will be eliminated by the just compensation pay-
ment.214  Nevertheless, this type of argument might fail because there 
are likely burdens that may not be undone or outweighed by a mone-
tary figure.  It is contended that “one reason why condemnation ac-
tions should receive a higher level of scrutiny than typical land use 
regulations . . . [is] the opportunity for government abuse, by paying 
just compensation to force the sale of citizen’s free speech or free 
exercise rights, is so great.”215  It cannot be forgotten that a high con-
stitutional standard still must be met for an eminent domain pro-
ceeding to be valid, regardless of whether or not such actions are sub-
ject to additional scrutiny under RLUIPA. 
The decision to not apply RLUIPA to eminent domain is fraught 
with negative implications for the religious community.  The power of 
religious institutions is slight compared to the power of the govern-
ment, and such a power differential will be especially detrimental in 
the eminent domain context because of religion’s irreplaceable bene-
fit to society.  RLUIPA was enacted to ward off possible attacks against 
religious institutions for their choice of land use, yet the failure to 
 
 211 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882–85. 
 212 See Storzer & Picarello, supra note 16, at 949. 
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protect religious institutions from the government’s power of emi-
nent domain, that freedom of choice can be more easily taken away. 
V. WHERE IS THE RLUIPA/EMINENT DOMAIN RELATIONSHIP GOING? 
Inevitably, the debate over RLUIPA’s application to eminent 
domain proceedings will continue until the Supreme Court rules de-
finitively on the subject.  In the meantime, some politicians suggest 
that amending RLUIPA to explicitly include eminent domain within 
the definition of land use regulation would be beneficial.216  It is ques-
tionable whether a proposed amendment to the Act would even pass 
constitutional muster.  The proposed amendment would dramatically 
alter the rational review standard set forth in Kelo for assessing exer-
cises of eminent domain power under the Takings Clause as it would 
replace the rational review standard with RLUIPA strict scrutiny re-
view.217  The Court has already rejected a congressional attempt to 
change the standard of review for Takings Clause controversies, find-
ing that “it [could not] unilaterally determine the constitutional 
standard under the Takings Clause, without transgressing the separa-
tion of powers: That standard is for the Supreme Court to set.”218  
Such an amendment also likely violates the Establishment Clause be-
cause it would give religious institutions extraordinary protection 
against takings but not provide other landowners with the same bene-
fit.219
Additionally, some politicians have suggested that Congress hold 
legislative hearings to determine the appropriate direction in which 
to focus this discussion and to brainstorm about possible solutions to 
the existing dilemma.  It is argued that constituents might want to 
inform members of Congress about the actual influence and impact 
of RLUIPA, namely “the fact that it has created an aristocracy of 
landowners—those that are religious—which has disserved many pri-
vate property owners.”220  Considering the judicial split over 
RLUIPA’s application to eminent domain proceedings and the slowly 
budding commentary on the issue, it seems that the controversial 
 
 216 Senator Edward Kennedy has proposed an amendment to RLUIPA.  See Emi-
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RLUIPA/eminent domain relationship will not terminate anytime 
soon.  Because it is unknown where the relationship is heading, as for 
now, the future of the relationship remains open-ended and waiting 
for the taking. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The government is on a slippery slope when it begins doling out 
privileges based on religious affiliations.  Allowing religion to trump 
every land use claim would be tyrannical.  An unofficial backyard bur-
ial site could end up blocking the construction of a major freeway.221  
As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor articulated in a 1988 opinion, “gov-
ernment simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every 
citizen’s religious needs and desires.”222  Arguing the unfairness of a 
church receiving special protection from the government’s taking of 
its land simply because the gravesites present are believed to be sa-
cred, while a mom-and-pop pizza restaurant would not be accorded a 
similar level of protection even though the government’s action 
would incontestably destroy the restaurant’s business, Eric Zorn con-
tends that “[w]hen the harms people merely believe in have greater 
standing than the harms people can actually prove, government has 
lost its neutrality in matters of faith, and genuine religious freedom 
again sails out the window.”223   
The debate is just beginning over RLUIPA’s application to emi-
nent domain actions.  Proposing that eminent domain proceedings 
are not per se land use regulations within the scope of RLUIPA, but 
could likely be found to be in the implementation of a land use regu-
lation under RLUIPA, this Comment recommends a middle ap-
proach to the issue that seems most equitable to both religious insti-
tutions and the government.  This Comment suggests that allowing 
takings to fit within RLUIPA’s scope only if they are found to be in 
the implementation of a land use regulation is a sophisticated solu-
tion to the problem currently facing state governments and religious 
institutions.  If such a position is accepted, the danger to the liveli-
hood of religious institutions and the security of their sacred burial 
sites will not be as acute and the government’s power to exercise their 
condemnation right will not be incorrectly usurped. 
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